Who Makes What, and Where with the US ISP CPE Supply Chain
Version 2.0 | March 24, 2026
senki.org | bgreene@senki.org
This research tool was curated from detailed questions by a +40-year Internet engineer, large network architect, and cybersecurity specialist. The questions were used to build out logic flows in multiple LLMs to gather insights into the potential impact of the March 2026 US FCC CPE guidelines. I’ve included a slide deck that summarizes this research tool. It is located below or through this link: The_2026_Broadband_Chokepoint.pdf |
The vast majority of residential broadband equipment deployed by America’s top 20 ISPs is designed by a handful of Taiwanese and European ODMs and assembled predominantly in China — though that is changing fast. Roughly a dozen contract manufacturers, led by Vantiva (formerly Technicolor), Sercomm, Arcadyan, Hitron, and Askey, produce virtually every gateway modem and router provisioned to U.S. homes. Nearly all of these devices run on Broadcom or Qualcomm chipsets fabricated at TSMC in Taiwan, creating a concentrated geopolitical chokepoint at the silicon level. Post-2018 Section 301 tariffs have triggered a measurable manufacturing migration toward Vietnam, Mexico, and India, but China remains the single largest assembly origin for U.S.-bound CPE as of early 2026.
This report was last updated March 24, 2026 — the same week a White House National Security Determination (NSD) dated March 20, 2026, triggered an FCC ruling adding all foreign-produced consumer-grade routers to the Covered List. The regulatory landscape for CPE procurement has fundamentally changed. See the “Regulatory Environment” section.
- National Security Determination on the Threat Posed by Routers Produced by Foreign Countries March 20, 2026
- OFFICE OF ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY ANNOUNCES WAIVER OF PROHIBITIONS ON CERTAIN CLASS I PERMISSIVE CHANGES TO COVERED ROUTERS ET Docket No. 21-232
The Big Five ISPs Account for Most U.S. Broadband CPE Volume
The five largest providers — Comcast, Charter, AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile — collectively serve over 85 million broadband connections and drive the bulk of CPE procurement.
Comcast / Xfinity (~32M subscribers)
Comcast ISP-brands all gateways as “Xfinity” and multi-sources across ODMs for supply-chain resilience.
Device | Model | OEM/ODM | Chipset | Country of Mfg |
XB10 (Wi-Fi 7, DOCSIS 4.0) | CGM601TCOM / SG417DBCT | Vantiva; Sercomm | Broadcom BCM33941UD (D4.0) | China (Vantiva); Taiwan/China (Sercomm) |
XB8 (Wi-Fi 6E, D3.1) | CGM4981COM | Vantiva | Broadcom D3.1 | China (Vantiva) |
XB7 (Wi-Fi 6, D3.1) | CGM4331COM / TG4482A | Vantiva; CommScope/Arris | Broadcom (Vantiva); Intel Puma (CommScope) | China |
XB6 (Wi-Fi 5, D3.1, legacy) | CGM4140COM / TG3482G | Vantiva; CommScope/Arris | Broadcom BCM3390 | China |
Comcast’s newest XB10 is the first consumer DOCSIS 4.0 gateway in the U.S., powered by Broadcom’s unified FDX/ESD chip. Sercomm’s entry as a second-source XB10 supplier marks a diversification away from Vantiva dominance.
Charter / Spectrum (~30M subscribers)
Spectrum uniquely separates modem and router, offering free DOCSIS modems and optional $5/month routers, multi-sourcing across four to five ODMs simultaneously.
Category | Models | OEM/ODMs | Notes |
DOCSIS 3.1 modems | EN2251, ES2251, ET2251, EU2251 | Hitron, Sercomm, Vantiva, Ubee | Free to subscribers; all Broadcom-based |
Wi-Fi 7 router | SBE1V1K | Askey (ASUS subsidiary) | Tri-band, 10GbE, Qualcomm Wi-Fi 7 silicon |
Wi-Fi 6E routers | SAX2V1S, SAX2V1R | Sagemcom, Sercomm | Tri-band with 6 GHz |
Wi-Fi 6 routers | SAX1V1K/S/R | Askey, Sagemcom, Sercomm | Dual-band |
10G EPON ONTs (fiber) | SONUV1H, SONUV1S, SONUV1N | Humax, Sagemcom, Hitron | For Spectrum fiber footprint |
Spectrum’s naming convention encodes the manufacturer: suffix K = Askey, S = Sagemcom, R = Sercomm, A = Arris/CommScope, H = Humax, N = Hitron.
AT&T (~14M subscribers)
Device | Model | OEM/ODM | Chipset | Country of Mfg |
BGW320-500 (fiber, Wi-Fi 6) | BGW320-500 | Humax (South Korea) | Broadcom | South Korea / China (Weihai) |
BGW320-505 (fiber, Wi-Fi 6) | BGW320-505 | Nokia | Broadcom | India (Chennai) or China |
BGW210-700 (fiber/DSL, Wi-Fi 5) | BGW210-700 | CommScope/Arris | Broadcom | China (via Pegatron) |
Internet Air hub (5G FWA, Wi-Fi 6) | CGW450-400 | Wistron NeWeb (Taiwan) | Qualcomm 5G | Taiwan / China |
AT&T’s fiber gateway strategy is notable for sourcing from Humax (Korea) and Nokia (India/Finland), two manufacturers with significant non-China production capacity.
Verizon (Fios + 5G Home, ~10M subscribers)
Device | Model | OEM/ODM | Notes |
Fios Router (Wi-Fi 6E) | CR1000A | Wistron NeWeb (Taiwan) | 10GbE LAN, current flagship |
Fios Router (Wi-Fi 6E) | CR1000B | Arcadyan (Taiwan) | Identical specs, alternate source |
Fios Router (Wi-Fi 6) | G3100 | Arcadyan | Tri-band, MoCA 2.5 |
5G Home Gateway | ASK-NCQ1338 | Askey (Taiwan/ASUS) | Qualcomm X55 5G, sub-6/mmWave |
5G Home Gateway | ARC-XCI55AX | Arcadyan | eSIM, newer variant |
Fios Quantum (legacy) | G1100 | Actiontec | Wi-Fi 5, still in field |
T-Mobile Home Internet (~6M subscribers)
T-Mobile’s rapid fixed-wireless growth has made it a major CPE buyer. All gateways are Qualcomm or MediaTek-powered.
Device | Model | OEM/ODM | Chipset | Country of Mfg |
5G Gateway Gen 5 (Wi-Fi 7) | TMOG5AR | Arcadyan | Qualcomm 5G | Vietnam (Arcadyan Vinh Phuc) or China (Kunshan) |
5G Gateway Gen 4 (Wi-Fi 6) | TMOG4AR | Arcadyan | MediaTek T750 | Vietnam / China |
5G Gateway Gen 4 (Wi-Fi 6) | TMOG4SE | Sercomm | 5G NR + LTE | Taiwan / China |
Sagemcom FAST 5688W (Wi-Fi 6) | FAST 5688W | Sagemcom | 5G NR | Tunisia / China |
Nokia 5G21 (Wi-Fi 6) | 5G21 | Nokia | 5G NR | India (Chennai) / China |
Arcadyan KVD21 (Wi-Fi 6) | KVD21 | Arcadyan | MediaTek T750 | China / Vietnam |

Mid-Tier ISPs Rely on a Similar Cast of ODMs
ISPs ranked roughly 6th through 10th collectively serve ~15 million connections and show the same manufacturer concentration.
Cox Communications (~5.5M subscribers)
Cox’s “Panoramic WiFi” line is sourced entirely from Vantiva/CommScope:
Device | Model | OEM | Wi-Fi |
Panoramic WiFi 8 | CGM4981COX | Vantiva | Wi-Fi 6E |
Panoramic WiFi 7 | CGM4331COX / TG4882 | Vantiva / CommScope | Wi-Fi 6 |
Panoramic WiFi 6 (legacy) | CGM4141COX | Vantiva | Wi-Fi 5 |
Lumen / CenturyLink / Quantum Fiber (~4M subscribers)
CenturyLink’s fiber brand “Quantum Fiber” has standardized on the Calix GigaSpire platform, while DSL subscribers receive Zyxel or Greenwave/Axon gateways (MitraStar-manufactured, Wuxi, China or Taiwan).
Technology | Key Models | OEM |
Fiber (SmartNID) | C5500XK, C6500XK, Q1000K | Calix (designed in San Jose, CA; assembled in Asia via contract mfg) |
Fiber ONT | Calix 716GE-I R2, 803G | Calix; also Adtran |
DSL | Greenwave C4000BG, Zyxel C4000LG/LZ | Zyxel / MitraStar (Wuxi, China; Hsinchu, Taiwan) |
Frontier Communications (~3.5M subscribers)
Frontier’s pivot to fiber brought a striking CPE decision: Amazon eero routers as the standard customer device, paired with Nokia fiber ONTs.
Device | OEM | Notes |
eero Max 7 (Wi-Fi 7) | eero / Amazon | Current flagship for all fiber tiers |
eero Pro 6E, Pro 6 | eero / Amazon | Deployed for various speed tiers |
Nokia G-010G-A/T (GPON ONT) | Nokia | Standard indoor bridge ONT |
Nokia XS-2426G-B (XGS-PON) | Nokia | Multi-gig ONT for 2+ Gbps tiers |
Note on eero manufacturing: Amazon’s eero devices are manufactured in China and Vietnam. The NSD’s broad definition of “production” — encompassing design and development in addition to assembly — means eero devices, whose hardware is designed in the United States but assembled overseas, will require Conditional Approval evaluation under the new FCC framework.
Mediacom (~1.4M) and Windstream/Kinetic (~1.1M subscribers)
Mediacom is notably Hitron-dominant, including the first U.S. DOCSIS 4.0 field trial device (Hitron CODA-60V). Windstream deploys a multi-vendor strategy: Actiontec for DSL, Nokia Beacon 6 for fiber, and Sagemcom FAST F5380 as a universal DSL/fiber gateway.
Smaller ISPs and the Calix Effect
Among ISPs ranked 11th through 20th, Calix GigaSpire is the de facto fiber CPE platform. The notable exception is Altice/Optimum (~4.5M subscribers) using Ubee gateways — Ubee is a Foxconn Industrial Internet subsidiary, making Optimum’s entire CPE fleet Foxconn-manufactured in China.
ISP | Primary CPE | OEM/ODM | Mfg Origin |
Altice / Optimum (~4.5M) | Gateway 6 (UBC1338AA92) | Ubee / Foxconn | China |
Google Fiber (~2M+) | Multi-Gig Router GFRG300 | Vantiva/Technicolor | Vietnam / China |
Consolidated / Fidium | GigaSpire BLAST u6.2 (GS4227E) | Calix | Asia (contract mfg) |
Brightspeed | Calix u6/u6t (fiber); Zyxel C4000 (DSL) | Calix; Zyxel/MitraStar | Asia |
Astound Broadband | Hitron CODA series; eero mesh | Hitron; Amazon/eero | China (Hitron Suzhou) |
WOW! | Calix GigaCenter 854G-1 (fiber); Technicolor (cable) | Calix; Vantiva | Asia |
Breezeline | Hitron gateways | Hitron | China (Suzhou) / Vietnam |
TDS Telecom | Calix/Adtran/Nokia ONTs | Multiple | Various |
Sparklight / Cable One | Standard DOCSIS modems; eero (fiber) | CommScope; Amazon/eero | China / various |
Where the Devices Are Actually Built
China remains the largest single production origin, but Vietnam is the fastest-growing alternative.
Manufacturer | HQ | Primary Assembly Locations | Key Shift |
Vantiva (fka Technicolor) | Paris, France | China (primary); Vietnam, Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, India | “Smart Lines” multi-site flexibility; Vietnam growing |
CommScope/Arris | Hickory, NC | China (via Pegatron in Shanghai/Kunshan); Mexico (Juárez, Reynosa) | Sold CPE division to Vantiva (Jan 2024); Pegatron is primary EMS |
Arcadyan | Hsinchu, Taiwan | China (Kunshan); Vietnam (Vinh Phuc) — rapidly expanding | Second Vietnam factory built; Vietnam is now growth hub |
Sercomm | Taipei, Taiwan | Taiwan; China; Mexico (Tijuana, opened July 2023); Philippines; India | Tijuana plant targets North American market |
Hitron | Hsinchu, Taiwan | China (Suzhou, primary); Vietnam (Haiphong, since 2020); Taiwan | Vietnam facility is clear tariff-mitigation move |
Askey (ASUS sub.) | New Taipei, Taiwan | China (Suzhou/Wujiang, 300K m² campus); Taiwan (Taoyuan); Vietnam (recent) | Vietnam added recently |
Sagemcom | Paris, France | Tunisia (Ben Arous) — primary CPE plant; China (Shenzhen); France | Tunisia is a non-China, non-tariffed production base |
Humax | Seongnam, South Korea | South Korea (Yongin); China (Weihai, Shandong); Poland; India; Thailand | Korean and Chinese dual-sourcing |
Calix | San Jose, CA | Outsourced to Asian contract manufacturers (Taiwan and China likely) | Fabless/assembly-less; relies on undisclosed ODMs |
Nokia (CPE div.) | Espoo, Finland | India (Chennai — 7M+ units); China; USA (Kenosha, WI — new) | Wisconsin plant for BEAD-eligible fiber equipment |
Ubee / Foxconn | Taiwan / China | China (Foxconn facilities) | Exclusive Altice/Optimum supplier |
Zyxel / MitraStar | Hsinchu, Taiwan | China (Wuxi, via MitraStar); Taiwan | Multi-location manufacturing claimed |
China (Suzhou, Kunshan, Wuxi, Shenzhen, Weihai) is the gravitational center of CPE assembly, with Vietnam (Vinh Phuc, Haiphong) as the primary alternative. Tunisia (Sagemcom), South Korea (Humax), and Mexico (Sercomm, CommScope) serve as secondary non-China options. Only Nokia has opened a U.S. CPE-relevant production facility, in Kenosha, Wisconsin.
Chipsets Trace Back to TSMC in Taiwan
Three companies design virtually all U.S. broadband CPE chips; one foundry fabricates most of them. DOCSIS chipsets are a Broadcom near-monopoly. 5G fixed-wireless chipsets are Qualcomm’s domain. Wi-Fi chipsets split between Broadcom, Qualcomm, and MediaTek. All are fabricated at TSMC.
Chipset Category | Primary Vendor(s) | Foundry | Node |
DOCSIS 3.1 | Broadcom (BCM3390/3392) | TSMC | 28nm |
DOCSIS 4.0 | Broadcom (BCM33941UD); MaxLinear (Puma 8) | TSMC | 6–7nm (Broadcom); ~12–16nm (MaxLinear) |
5G FWA modem | Qualcomm (X55/X62/X65) | TSMC | 4–7nm |
Wi-Fi 6/6E/7 | Broadcom, Qualcomm, MediaTek | TSMC | 6–16nm |
DSL/xDSL | MaxLinear (Lantiq heritage); Broadcom | TSMC / GlobalFoundries | 28nm+ |
A disruption at TSMC would halt production of every new broadband gateway in the United States, regardless of where final assembly occurs.
Tariffs Are Reshaping the Map, but Slowly
Section 301 tariffs (25% on most Chinese-origin networking equipment) have been the primary driver of manufacturing shifts since 2018. Arcadyan, Hitron, Sercomm, and Vantiva have all diversified toward Vietnam, Mexico, and other locations. However, China’s mature ecosystem and billions in sunk investment slow the transition. For BEAD-funded projects, Build America Buy America (BABA) requirements apply to fiber infrastructure but consumer CPE (routers, gateways) is explicitly waived — meaning BEAD will not meaningfully change CPE manufacturing geography.
Regulatory Environment: A Fundamental Shift in March 2026
⚠ BREAKING — March 23, 2026 The FCC has added all consumer-grade routers produced in foreign countries to its Covered List, effective immediately for new device models. This follows a White House National Security Determination (NSD) dated March 20, 2026. The implications for every ISP’s CPE procurement pipeline are immediate and severe. |
The National Security Determination (NSD)
On March 20, 2026, a White House-convened executive branch interagency body — exercising authority under 47 U.S.C. § 1601(c)(1) — issued a formal determination that consumer-grade routers produced in any foreign country pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States and to the safety and security of U.S. persons.
The NSD rests on two primary findings:
- Foreign-produced routers “introduce a supply chain vulnerability that could disrupt the U.S. economy, critical infrastructure, and national defense.”
- Foreign-produced routers establish “a severe cybersecurity risk that could be leveraged to immediately and severely disrupt U.S. critical infrastructure and directly harm U.S. persons.”
Critically, the NSD defines production to encompass any major stage of the process through which the device is made, including manufacturing, assembly, design, and development. This is broader than prior trade or tariff frameworks and means that a router designed in the United States but assembled overseas remains subject to the determination.

The NSD explicitly links the decision to China’s Volt Typhoon, Flax Typhoon, and Salt Typhoon cyberattack campaigns, all of which leveraged compromised foreign-produced routers to gain access to U.S. critical infrastructure. It cites the September 2025 CISA joint advisory AA25-239A, which documented PRC APT actors modifying router configurations for lateral movement and using virtualized containers on network devices to evade detection.
The NSD further references the October 2024 Microsoft Storm-0940 disclosure, in which Microsoft documented a Chinese APT using password-spray attacks via compromised foreign-produced routers to target government agencies, NGOs, think tanks, law firms, energy companies, IT providers, and defense industrial base entities across North America and Europe.
The policy foundation is the 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS, November 2025), which states: “the United States must never be dependent on any outside power for core components — from raw materials to parts to finished products — necessary to the nation’s defense or economy.”
FCC Covered List Action (March 23, 2026)
The FCC updated its Covered List to include all consumer-grade routers produced in foreign countries. Operational effects:
Conditional Approval Pathway
The NSD establishes a Conditional Approval mechanism (Annex A) allowing foreign-producing entities to apply for conditional authorization to continue receiving FCC equipment approval for new models, provided they commit to a plan for shifting manufacturing to the United States. This is as much an industrial policy instrument as a security measure.

TP-Link as the Accelerant
Since late 2024, the U.S. Department of Justice has been conducting a criminal antitrust investigation into TP-Link Systems Inc., which controls approximately 65% of the U.S. home and small-business router market. The DOJ probe examines whether TP-Link engaged in predatory pricing and whether its ties to China present a national security risk. The Department of Commerce is conducting a parallel national security review. These investigations established the political scaffolding for a broader determination covering all foreign-produced consumer routers.
What This Means for ISP CPE Procurement
Every ISP now faces the same fundamental constraint: no new foreign-produced consumer router model can receive FCC authorization. Key implications:

Conclusion
The U.S. residential broadband CPE ecosystem is a study in hidden concentration — one that has now collided with explicit national security policy. Fewer than 15 ODMs — predominantly headquartered in Taiwan and France — produce equipment for all 20 major ISPs. At the silicon level, the concentration is even tighter: Broadcom and TSMC together form an irreplaceable link in the DOCSIS cable gateway chain, while Qualcomm and TSMC do the same for fixed wireless.
The devices American consumers know as “Xfinity gateways” or “Spectrum routers” or “T-Mobile home internet boxes” are overwhelmingly designed in Taiwan, powered by chips fabricated in Taiwan, and assembled in China — a supply chain reality that tariff policy was already bending but had not broken.
As of March 24, 2026, the policy environment has fundamentally shifted. The White House NSD and the subsequent FCC Covered List action represent the most significant government intervention in the consumer CPE supply chain in the history of U.S. broadband. The near-term result is a frozen market for new foreign-produced router models. The medium-term result — if Conditional Approval requirements mandate actual U.S. domestic production — would be a structural transformation of the ODM ecosystem with no clear precedent in the electronics industry. The long-term supply chain question is no longer just about tariffs. It is about whether the United States can build or attract a domestic router manufacturing capability fast enough to serve an 85-million-subscriber broadband market that currently imports nearly 100% of its CPE.
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