What follows is a work of fiction written in Claude Fable 5.1, based on a series of risk assessments drawing on Quentin Kaiser’s work. The risk is real. Security researcher Quentin Kaiser disclosed the Broadcom WPS vulnerability at Hexacon 2026. It represents a structural failure in proprietary 802.11 wireless frame processing across multiple operating systems, Read More
Category: Scaling
Your Ransomware “Rescuer” Might Be Part of the Problem – BCPs from the MonsterCloud Indictment
Ransomware is not a hurricane. It is not an earthquake. It is not “weather.” It is a human-built criminal economy – and like any economy, it runs on money, incentives, and people who profit from keeping the engine running. The September 2026 indictment of Zohar Pinhasi and his firm MonsterCloud LLC is a wake-up call Read More
Essential Guide: Mitigating MikroTik Threats on Your Network
Active exploitation of the September 2026 MikroTrick vulnerability chain has put exposed MikroTik devices at immediate risk of full unauthenticated takeover. Learn the fixed RouterOS builds, how to identify compromise indicators like the new Flagged state, and how to harden your management plane against Internet-wide abuse. Read More
Threat Researchers Leveraging Shadowserver for Responsible Disclosure
Discover how a threat researcher turned an exposed SNMP risk on an untracked ISP network into a global remediation win. Learn how to leverage the Shadowserver Foundation and National CSIRTs as your responsible disclosure allies to validate threats, protect networks, and get proper credit for your findings. Read More
CEO’s Wake Up! Operation Ramz, Shadowserver, and the Case for Funding Public-Benefit Cyber Defense
“Cybercrime is a borderless, multi-billion-dollar enterprise. We cannot defend against it solely by building taller walls around individual networks. Operation Ramz proves that actionable intelligence, combined with trusted public-private partnerships, results in actual arrests and dismantled infrastructure.” The organizations most concerned about cybercrime must fund the non-profit engine that actually disrupts it. Call to Action: Visit shadowserver.org/partner/ to invest in action. Read More
In Tribute to Peter G. Neumann (1932–2026) – Service, Sound Systems, and the Work That Remains
Peter Neumann said, “Security is a set of end-to-end total-system emergent properties,” and “Strength in Depth is desirable, but we have Weakness in Depth.” He quotes Einstein — “Everything should be made as simple as possible, but no simpler” — and warns that oversimplifying security leads to flaws. Read More
Origin of Protective DNS and RPZ
The Architectural Evolution of Protective DNS: From Academic Prototyping to Global Security Standard The historical trajectory of the Domain Name System (DNS) has transitioned from a rudimentary directory service into the fundamental control plane of modern internet security. This transformation was neither accidental nor purely market-driven; it was the result of a protracted conflict between Read More
FAQ – Which Shadowserver Reports list CVEs
FAQ – Which Shadowserver Reports list CVEs? Many people frequently ask how Shadowserver includes CVEs (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) in its reports. Currently, there are over 140 reports published, with more on the way. The Shadowserver Alliance is active, working together to support the Shadowserver initiative and develop new report types. It’s a logical question Read More
US ISP CPE SUPPLY CHAIN
Who Makes What, and Where with the US ISP CPE Supply Chain Version 2.0 | March 24, 2026 senki.org | bgreene@senki.org This research tool was curated from detailed questions by a +40-year Internet engineer, large network architect, and cybersecurity specialist. The questions were used to build out logic flows in multiple LLMs to gather insights Read More
How do you get 29 organizations to collaborate to disrupt multiple threat actors’ operational infrastructure?
How do you get 29 organizations to collaborate to disrupt multiple threat actors’ operational infrastructure? (see the list below) What is not stated is that this group is the known TLP: RED group. There is a larger TLP: AMBER community of supporting individuals and organizations. These groups all exist and will continue to put pressure Read More